Women in "Japan Incorporated": Outsiders or Catalysts for Change?  by Junichi Goto
 
 
INDES WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
WOMEN IN “JAPAN INCORPORATED” 
 
OUTSIDERS OR CATALYSTS FOR CHANGE? 
                    
  
                    Junichi Goto 























Integration and Regional Programs Department   
         Inter-American Institute for Social Development 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
May 2000. Working Paper Series I-12  






Women in  “Japan Incorporated” 
--  
































Copyright @ 2000 
The Inter-American Development Bank 
1300 New York Avenue 




This paper is the result of one of the studies conducted by the IDB addressing the major economic and social 
problem affecting Latin America and the Caribbean.  Copies are available at the Library of the Inter-American 
Development Bank, 1300 New York Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20577, U.S.A. 
 
The objective of the working paper series is to present the results and conclusions of studies carried out by the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Department of Integration and Regional Programs, in order to promote the 
exchange of ideas and opinions on topics relating to economic and social development.  Additionally, the purpose of 
the series is to get the findings out as soon as possible, even though the presentation may be less than perfect. 
 
The views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Bank or its member 
countries. 
 




1.  Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………  1 
 
2.  Gender Gap in the Egalitarian Society:  Japan vs. Latin America …………………….  3 
 
3.  Salient Features of the Female Work force in Japan  .…………………………………  9 
 
4.  Why is the Gender Gap so Large in Japan? - Women and “Japan Incorporated” …….. 16 
 









The author wishes to thank Nohra Rey de Marulanda, Bernardo Kliksberg, Karen 
Mokate, Carlos G. Molina, Manuel Contreras, Armando Loera, José Núñez del Arco, and 
participants at the INDES seminar for their useful comments and suggestions and Ana 
Hurtado van Oordt and Beatriz Warner for their help in preparing the present  
manuscript.  
 





Although Japan is much richer than Latin America and income distribution in Japan generally is 
much more equitable than in Latin America, the Japanese gender gap is one of the worst in the world, 
much worse than that of many Latin American countries.  Using various data, I have tried in the 
present paper to explain the apparent paradox of the existence of a huge gender gap in an egalitarian 
society.  The most probable explanation seems to be that women are often kept away from the 
mainstream system of Japan Incorporated, mainly due to career interruption for marriage and/or 
childbearing.  Possible prescriptions for narrowing the gender gap in Japan seem to be twofold: (i) 
measures to include women within the mainstream system of Japan Incorporated and (ii) measures to 
make Japan Incorporated more humane to everyone, both men and women.  Although the data 
presented in the paper are mainly Japanese data, there are many important lessons here for Latin 


























 I. Introduction 
The world has been increasingly interconnected both economically and politically ever since the 
end of the World War II.  In addition to the increase in the movement of goods (international 
trade) and the movement of money (foreign investment), we have observed increased amount of 
movement of labor (international migration) in various parts of the world.  For example, 
European countries, notably Germany and France, have accepted a large number of migrant 
workers from neighboring countries for many years.  In the United States, huge number of 
migrant workers, both legal and illegal, have been flowing from various countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  While Japan had been a fairly closed country to foreigners for many 
years, the influx of migrant workers emerged in the mid-1980s when an economic boom brought 
about serious labor shortage created an economic boom.  Initially, most of these foreign workers 
are illegal migrant workers from neighboring Asian countries.  However, since the revision of 
the Japanese immigration law in 1990, there has been a dramatic influx of the Latin American of 
Japanese origin (Nikkei) because these people are now allowed to do whatever activities in 
Japan, including an unskilled work that is prohibited to foreigners in principle.  The number of 
these Latin American migrants is estimated to be around 150,000 to 200,000. 
 
Faced with such an increasing number of foreign workers, there have been lively (political) 
debates in Japan on the possible impact of migration on Japan as well as on sending developing 
countries. Some are generally in favor of migration, and argue that the movement of workers 
from labor-abundant countries (developing countries) to labor-scarce countries (advanced 
countries) would enhance the economic welfare in both countries by realizing more efficient 
allocation of labor, and that, faced with the aging population in Japan, the admission of foreign 
workers is the only alternative to cope with expected labor shortage in the near future.  Others 
are strongly against the admission of (unskilled) migrant workers, arguing that it would give a 
dampening effect on wages of the Japanese workers and that the large-scale admission of 
foreigners would create social problems such as the increase in crimes.  However, arguments of 
both sides often goes emotional and are based on anecdotal evidences arising from their personal 
experiences.  Therefore, objective studies of the social and economic effects of international 
migration are keenly needed for policy makers as well as ordinary citizens in both receiving and 
sending counties of migrant workers.  In addition to Japan, international migration is often one of the most important political issues in other part of the world, such as the United States and 
countries in Latin America.   
 
In view of the above, the purpose of this paper is to analyze, both theoretically and empirically, 
the economic and social impact of international migration both on receiving countries and 
sending countries, taking the workers coming from Asia and Latin America to Japan as an 
example.  This paper focuses on temporary guest workers that come to work in Japan for a few 
years and remit most of their incomes to their home countries, because it is this type of migrant 
worker that has been rapidly increasing in Japan.  Further, the emphasis of the discussion is 
placed on the situation from mid-1980s to mid-1990s, because there were very few guest 
workers in Japan before mid-1980s and because the increasing trend of guest workers are 
temporarily suspended by the recent severe economic situation in Japan.   
 
In section II, salient features of migrant workers in Japan will be examined first, in order to give some background 
facts of the issue.  As will be discussed in detail below, there are two groups of migrant workers, who have 
dramatically increased since the mid-1980s: (i) illegal unskilled workers from neighboring Asian countries and (ii) 
legal unskilled workers from Latin American countries.  After the overview of the basic data, the reasons of the 
sharp increase of migrant workers in Japan during this period will be discussed.   
 
In Section III, theoretical discussions of international migration will be presented.  While the orthodox economic 
theory is generally in favor of migration because, according to their theory, international migration implies the 
movement of workers from labor-abundant (capital-scarce) countries to labor-scarce (capital-abundant) countries, 
the new theory, which incorporates various reality such as the existence of trade barriers and non-traded goods, 
provides ambiguous picture of the impact of international migration, because it gives both positive effects and 
negative effects, as will be discussed in greater detail in Section III.   In addition to the economic impact, social 
impact of migration is also examined.  Unlike international trade (movement of goods) and international investment 
(movement of money), migration means the international movement of human being as a whole, who performs 
various social activities as well as economic activities, and therefore, the examination of social effects of migration 
is also very important. 
 
In Section IV, some estimates of the magnitude of economic and social effects of migration will be provided.  
Contrary to the argument of the orthodox economic theory, the two estimates given in Section IV suggest that 
international migration might give adverse effects, both economically and socially.   
 
Section V summarizes the major findings of the paper.  
II.    Major characteristics of Migrant Workers in Japan 
Three Categories of Migrant Workers 
Legal Skilled Workers 
Table 1 summarizes the number of migrant workers by visa categories in Japan.  The number of legal and skilled 
workers is very small at 67,983, or about 0.1 percent of total labor force in Japan.  Even when unskilled workers, 
mostly from Latin America, and working students are included, the number of legal migrant workers is 267,269, or 
just 0.41 percent of total labor force.  This is partly due to the strict Japanese immigration law, which severely 
restricts jobs that foreign workers can take in Japan.  Therefore, most legal foreign workers, except for the Latin 
Americans of Japanese origin called Nikkei (see below for the detailed discussions of Nikkei), are professional 
workers, such as professors, researchers, lawyers, accountants etc.  
 
The share of legal foreign workers in total labor force in Japan is far smaller than those in European countries.  
Figure 1 shows the share of migrant workers in the total labor force in Japan and several European countries.  While 
the share of foreign workers in total labor force is around seven percent in France and Germany (and as high as 
seventeen percent in Switzerland), the corresponding figure for Japan is less than one percent. 
 
 
Table 1.  Foreign Workers in Japan (1991) 
 






Latin American of Japanese origin 
(148,700) 
 
Working students  (50,586) 
 





Total Labor Force In Japan 
65,050,000 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Labor. 
 
 
While illegal migrant workers has been rapidly increasing since mid-1980s (see below), there are almost no 
increasing trend of the number of legal and skilled foreign workers.  Figure 2 shows the number of foreign entrants 
with working visas since 1976.  At the first glance, we may have an impression that the number of new entrants of 
legal foreign workers shows quadruple increase from 30 thousand in 1980 to 114 thousand in 1991.  However, 
careful examination reveals that only "entertainers" have increased and there are no increasing trends in other skilled workers, at least as far as the situations before the revision of immigration law in 1990 are concerned.  The number 
of entrants of "other skilled workers" is 11 thousand in 1989, which is about the same as the number in 1976.  
Although "entertainers" visas are supposed to be issued to real entertainers such as actors, actresses, singers etc., it is 
often pointed out that many (or most?) of the "entertainers" are disguised unskilled workers, who come to Japan to 
work in notorious sectors. 
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entertainment
otherWhile the number of real skilled and professional migrant workers in Japan is small and there are no conspicuously 
increasing trend in recent years, there are two groups of migrant workers that show a dramatic increasing trend: (i) 
illegal unskilled workers from neighboring Asian countries and (ii) legal Latin American workers of Japanese 
origin, who are often called Nikkei (or Nikkeijin) workers.  In what follows, these two groups of migrant workers 
will be discussed in detail. 
 
Illegal Unskilled Workers 
 
Although the number of migrant workers (both legal and illegal) in Japan is less than half a 
million, or less than one percent of her labor force (see Table 1), the rate of increase in the 
number of illegal foreign workers has been dramatic since the mid-1980s. As Figure 3 shows, the 
number of illegal foreign workers apprehended by the authorities has sharply increased from 
2,339 in 1983 to 64,341 in 1993. Although the number declined a little after that due to the 
severe recession of the Japanese economy, the number of illegal migrant workers are far greater 
than the level before mid-1980s. Needless to say, these numbers represent only a small part of 
the total illegal foreign workers in Japan.  According to the Ministry of Justice, the total number 
of illegal foreign workers in Japan is estimated at 200, 000 - 300, 000. 
 
Just as most illegal aliens in the United States come from Mexico and other neighboring countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, most illegal foreign workers in Japan come from neighboring Asian countries (See Table 2). 
Since the wage rate in their home countries is extremely low, even a discriminatory low wage by the Japanese 
standard means a lot to these workers. 
 
The recent influx of Asian workers is markedly different from earlier migrations. Until the middle of the 1980s, 
most of the illegal foreign workers were women who worked as bar hostesses (so-called "Japayuki San (Miss Japan-
going)").  In 1983-84, for example, more than 90 percent of the illegal foreign workers were female. But, the 
number of male workers dramatically increased to about 70-80 percent of the total illegal immigrants by 1990. (See 
Figure 3) 
 
As seen in Table 3, in 1994, about 40 percent of the illegal male workers were construction workers, and a little over 
a quarter were factory workers. Most of the illegal male aliens are doing work for which there is a high demand due 
to the boom in the Japanese economy, but work that few Japanese want to do because of unfavorable working 
conditions. It should be noted that about two-thirds of the illegal migrants are working in the nontraded goods  
sector, such as construction and service industries.  
Table 2.  Illegal Foreign Workers by Country of Origin (1994) 
 
Number  Share (%)   
Total 
 
Male  Female  Total  Male  Female 

























































































1 Including Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice. 
 FIGURE 3 
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  Female
   Male 
Table 3.  Illegal Foreign Workers by Activities (1994) 
  Number  Share(%) 
Male  Total  40,029  100.0 
  Construction worker
* 




































Female  Total  19,323  100.0 







































1 summation of items with an asterisk. 
Source:   The Japanese Ministry of Justice. 
 
Legal Unskilled Workers -- Latin American of Japanese Origin (Nikkei) 
The impact of the revision of the Japanese immigration law in 1990 
 
In addition to the illegal foreign workers discussed above, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of Latin 
American workers of Japanese origin (Nikkei) since late 1980s.  The influx of these workers is mainly due to the 
revised immigration law in Japan, which was enacted in 1989 and was put into effect in June 1990.  While the 
Japanese immigration law does not allow foreigners to take an unskilled job in principle, the revised law made it 
possible for "a foreign citizen whose parent or grandparent was a Japanese citizen" to do whatever activities 
(including unskilled work) in Japan.  Further, these people are allowed to stay in Japan for three years (instead of 
three months for visitors).   
The revision of the immigration law resulted in the dramatic increase of workers from Latin American countries 
such as Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia, to which many Japanese citizens had emigrated long time ago.  Since 
the wage rate in Japan is much higher (and Japanese society is much safer) than that in Latin America, a host of 
Latin American people of the Japanese origin (Nikkei) were attracted to Japan.  According to the newspaper reports, 
some people fell into huge debt to pay for their travel cost, and other people without Japanese origin were arrested 
for forgery of their birth certificate or using other person's identification.  Figure 4 shows the number of these Nikkei workers coming from Latin America to Japan since 1988.  While the number of Nikkei workers in Japan was only 
eight thousand at the end of 1988, the year before the revised immigration law was enacted, after that the number of 
Nikkei workers doubled every year to become around 150,000 in June 1991.  As Table 4 shows, about 80 percent of 
these peoples are from Brazil, and remainders are from Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay, to which countries 
many Japanese emigrated long time ago. 
 
Table 4.  Guest Workers from Latin America  
Country  Workers in Japan 
People with Japanese 


























Total  148,700  1,403,000  10.6 
Source:  The Japanese Ministry of Labor. 
Single male in car parts factory. 
 
Then, what are salient features of these Nikkei workers coming from Latin America to Japan?  The Ministry of 
Labor in Japan published a result of the survey on Nikkei workers in Japan, and the following discussion is mainly 
based on this survey result. 
 
According to the survey, most of them are young male: About two thirds of them are male, and 
the majority of them are under thirty years old.  About two thirds are coming to Japan by 
himself, and only thirteen percent of them bring their entire family to Japan.  
 
Almost all (more than ninety percent) of these males are working as production workers in manufacturing sector.  
About one third of them are employed in transport equipment production sector (most of them are car parts factory).   
This constitutes a striking contrast with illegal unskilled workers from Asia, who are employed mainly in the 
nontraded good sectors such as construction and services. 
 
Conditions of Nikkei workers in Japan 
 
What are the working conditions of these Nikkei workers in Japan?   When we compare hourly wage of the Nikkei 
workers with that of the Japanese counterpart, there are no big difference between the two.  Since they are legally 
employed, employers tend to pay them by regular hourly wages.  However, the annual income of these Nikkei 
workers is much smaller than that of Japanese workers, because most of the Nikkei workers are employed on daily basis and paid by hourly wage.  Note that, in terms of wage structure, blue-collar production workers in Japan are 
similar to white-collar workers in the United States.  Most of the blue-collar production workers in Japan receive 
monthly salary (instead of hourly wages).  Further, these salaried workers in Japan receive bonus payments twice a 
year, and enjoy various fringe benefits.  The bonus payment in Japan constitutes a substantial part of their annual 
income, and the amount of average bonus is equal to five months salary.  Therefore, even though hourly wage rate 
of Nikkei workers is similar to that of the Japanese counterpart, their annual income is much smaller than Japanese 






















Dec-88 Dec-89 Dec-90 Jun-91Further, the Nikkei workers are often exploited by brokers or mediators.  According to the survey result, less than 
half of Nikkei workers are directly employed by the firm where they actually work.  More than half of Nikkei 
workers are employed by mediator agencies and are sent by them to the factories.  Hence, the amount of income of 
Nikkei workers is usually smaller than what the factories are paying for their work.  In some cases, exploitation by 
gangsters was also reported.  For example, in October 1989, a president of a mediator agency was arrested for illegal 
exploitation.  According to the newspaper report, he employed 2,000 Brazilians and sent them to several factories.  
He pocketed about 30-40 percent of their wages and was benefited by three billion yen (or about 30 million dollars).   
 
Further, the above survey reveals that most of the Nikkei workers are working without medical insurance and 
unemployment insurance.  In Japan, almost hundred percent of workers (and their family) are covered by very 
generous government sponsored medical insurance program.  Workers contribute to the medical insurance program 
according to their income. And, the deductibles are nominal.  No matter how high the actual medical cost is, the 
payment out of the patient pocket does not exceed about five hundred dollars a month and the balance is paid by the 
insurance program.  Very poor people can enjoy the same benefit as the others without contributing anything. 
 
However, according to the above survey, only twenty-three percent of the Nikkei workers are covered by the 
generous medical insurance program, probably because both employers and Nikkei workers themselves do not want 
to pay their contribution to the program.  But, in case of illness or accident, these Nikkei workers have to pay 100 






Thus, conditions of these Nikkei workers are generally lower than those of the Japanese workers, although the 
income of these Nikkei workers in Japan is probably higher than what they would get in their home country.
1   
 
Impact on the home country in Latin America 
 
What is the impact of emigration of these Nikkei workers on families left out in their home country and on the 
society of home country as a whole?  Needless to say, the major purpose of these Nikkei workers to come to Japan is 
to make money and remit their income to the home country.  According to the survey, more than ninety percent of 
the Nikkei workers say that the major purpose of coming to Japan is to make money and go back to their home 
country within a few years.  For that purpose, they have to pay (a large amount) of travel cost to come to Japan, 
because only one percent of the firms in Japan say that they pay travel cost for the Nikkei workers.  It is reported that 
                                                                 
1  It should be also noted that in order to come to work in Japan, the Nikkei workers have to bear (huge) costs of 
transportation and relocation.    the entire families of these Nikkei workers incur huge debt to pay for the travel and settling-in cost.  Then, do they 
succeed in pursuing the initial objective, i.e., to send a big money to their home country?  The answer to this 
question is ambiguous.  While twenty eight percent of Nikkei workers remit more than fifty percent of their income 
to their home country, twenty two percent of them say that they do not remit at all.   
 
In addition, the impact of their emigration on the Nikkei society in the home country is enormous, because the share 
of the number of Nikkei workers who emigrated to Japan in the total number of Nikkei population in their home 
countries is very high.  Table 4 shows the number of Nikkei workers emigrated to Japan and  the number of people 
with Japanese origin in their home countries (Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay).  The emigration ratio 
(the share of emigrated Nikkei workers in total Nikkei population) is more than ten percent for five countries as a 
whole, and the ratio exceeds a quarter for Argentina and Bolivia (in other words, in these two countries, one in every 
four Nikkei goes to Japan to work!).   
 
Moreover, the adverse impact of their emigration on their home country is all the more serious because highly 
educated people tend to emigrate for higher wage in Japan.  As Table 5 shows, more than forty percent of them are 
college graduate or above, and more than ninety percent of them are high school graduate or above.  Although the 
Nikkei workers are in most cases employed as unskilled workers in Japan, highly educated people emigrate to Japan 
because the wage rate of unskilled workers in Japan is higher than that of skilled workers in their home country.  
However, such emigration of highly educated people causes a serious shortage of skilled and professional workers, 
such as doctors and teachers, in their home country. 
 
 
Table 5.  Education Level of Latin American Migrants of Japanese Origin (%) 
 
College or above  
Professional school  








Source: Kaigai Nikkeijin Kyokai. 
 
 
Reasons for the Sharp Increase -- Push and Pull 
 
Why did many unskilled foreign workers suddenly come to Japan after the middle of the 1980s?   While it is clear 
that the most important reason for the increase in the Nikkei workers from Latin America is the revision of the Japanese immigration law in 1990
2, the reasons for the influx of illegal foreign workers from neighboring Asian 
countries are not so obvious. 
 
 
One of the most important reasons is that a push-force in neighboring Asian countries coincided with a pull-force in 
the Japanese economy in the 1980s, as discussed in detail below.  The inflow of Asian migrant workers is often 
attributed to the huge wage gap between Japan and neighboring Asian countries. Indeed, there is a huge income gap 
between Japan and Asian sending countries. It is often the case that the per capita income in Japan is 50 to 100 times 
higher than those in sending Asian countries.  It should be noted, however, that the huge income differential had 
existed for many years. Although the sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen after September 1985 amplified the gap 
to some extent, the wage level of Japan had been high enough to constitute a potential incentive for Asian workers to 
migrate to Japan for many years. Therefore, the huge wage differential cannot explain the surge in the flow of Asian 
workers since the mid-1980s.  
 
Probably, one of the most important reasons on the supply side for the sharp increase is that the destination of Asian 
migrant workers has shifted from the Middle East to Japan. In the 1970s, an increasing number of Asians had been 
recruited to work at construction sites in the oil producing Middle Eastern countries. When the price of crude oil 
quadrupled after the First Oil Crisis in 1973, a construction boom occurred in the oil-rich countries because their oil 
revenue dramatically increased. But the population size of these countries in the Middle East is relatively small. 
Therefore, these rich countries recruited a large number of temporary immigrants mostly from southern Europe and 
Asia. As a result, the number of migrant workers from eight Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea) to the Middle East grew from a little more than 100 
thousand in 1976 to more than 1.2 million in 1982. But, as the price of crude oil went down in the 1980s, the 
construction boom in the Middle East subsided, and some 400 thousand Asian migrant workers lost their jobs and 
had to return to their home countries. 
 
The return of these workers was a serious blow to the Asian sending countries, because remittance from them was 
an important source of foreign exchange receipt.  In Pakistan and Bangladesh, for example, remittance from migrant 
workers was almost as large as the total value of their exports. Moreover, the dependence of the migrant workers 
from these Asian countries on the Middle East for their destination was extremely heavy. Therefore, the decline in 
labor demand in the Middle East created a large pool of Asian workers who lost jobs in the Middle East and were 
eager to find new jobs in some other countries. Probably, to these unemployed workers, one of their rich neighbors, 
Japan, must have looked like a new land of opportunity. 
 
                                                                 
2  As discussed above, after the revision of the immigration law, these Nikkei workers can legally take unskilled 
work, while such unskilled work is still prohibited to other foreign workers.  The increase in the supply pressure coincided with the increased demand of Japanese businesses for the migrant 
workers. Due to the strong performance of the Japanese economy, the labor market in Japan became very tight since 
the mid-1980s. The labor shortage was especially keen in the construction and service industries. Moreover, an 
important source of the domestic supply of marginal workers (i.e., a group of seasonal workers called "dekasegi") 
has shrunk, and therefore, the demand for migrant workers to fill the gap in this marginal labor market increased. 
 
The performance of the Japanese economy after the middle of the 1980s was dramatic: the annual growth rates of 
the real GNP in 1988, 1989, and 1990 were 6.2%, 4.7%, and 5.6%, respectively; those of industrial production in 
1988, 1989, and 1990 were 9.5%, 6.1%, and 4.6%, respectively. Consequently, the labor market became very tight, 
and the job-opening/job-seeker ratio (one of the most commonly used indicators of the labor market condition in 
Japan) sharply increased. While the ratio nose-dived in 1975 (the First Oil Recession) and stayed at around 0.6 (i.e., 
only six jobs were available for every 10 job seekers), it began to increase after 1987.  In 1988, the ratio exceeded 
one for the first time since 1974, and it went as high as 1.40 in 1990
3. 
 
A typical practice of Japanese firms in boom years has been to increase the number of marginal workers, such as 
seasonal and temporary workers, because firms had at least a moral obligation to keep their regular employees on 
the payroll even in a recession. However, the construction industry is losing an important source of its supply of 
domestic nonregular workers. Until the end of the 1970s, the labor shortage in the construction industry in boom 
years had been largely filled by seasonal workers, dekasegi, who were mostly farmers in the northern part of Japan 
who came to metropolitan areas like Tokyo and Osaka to take temporary jobs in an attempt to supplement their farm 
incomes in the farmers' slack season. In the early 1970s, the number of dekasegi amounted to about 600,000. But, 
because of increased job opportunities in their home towns, that number has been steadily diminishing: only 142,200 
dekasegi were reported in 1993. The decline in the supply of dekasegi, along with the recent construction boom, 
created a serious labor shortage in the construction industry. The strong demand for marginal workers in the 
Japanese construction industry attracted an increasing number of foreign workers whose supply pressure had been 
increased by the decreasing demand in the Middle East.  
 
Faced with the strong push-force and pull-force, illegal mediators between Japanese employers and Asian migrants 
(like the "coyote" figure for Mexican illegal aliens in the United States) have become prevalent. Although the details 
of their illegal activities are unknown, involvement of gangsters was often reported. According to an estimate by the 
Japanese Ministry of Justice, in 1990 about 70 percent of illegal migrant workers entered Japan with the help of such 
illegal mediators. 
 
                                                                 
3  The job-opening/job-seeker ratio in 1998 is mere 0.53. III.  The Impact of Migration – Some Theoretical Consideration 
The Economic Effect of Migration on the Host Country 
Conventional Wisdom – What Does the Textbook Economics Say? 
 
Economic theorists usually consider that the overall effect of international migration is favorable 
to both home and host countries, because it involves the movement of labor from a labor 
abundant (and capital scarce) country to a labor scarce (and capital abundant) country, and 
therefore, it will increase productivity (and economic welfare) in both countries.  For example, 
when some workers move from Mexico (a labor abundant country) to the United States (a labor 
scarce country), the U.S. employers who have been suffering from unfilled vacancy can gain 
from hiring these workers and the Mexican workers can usually earn more than what they could 
earn in Mexico.  If these workers remit some part of their income earned in the U.S. to their 
home country, people left behind in Mexico are also benefited from the migration of their fellow 
Mexicans indirectly.  Of course, there could be some conflict of interests among various 
economic agents in each country.  For example, an inflow of Mexican workers may give 
dampening effect on U.S. wages, and thereby the income of American workers could decrease 
while income of employers in the U.S. increases even more.  But, overall effect is usually 
positive in both countries. Thus, the movement of workers (or unemployed persons) from the 
home country to the host country would increase national incomes (and economic welfare) in 
both countries. 
 
The economic reasoning for their argument of  the economic gain can be summarized in Figure 
5.  In the figure, the horizontal axis plots the amount of labor supply, where the amounts of labor 
supply in country 1 (home country) and that in country 2 (host country) are measured from O1 
and O2, respectively. Vertical axis plots marginal productivity of labor (MPL), which is equal to 
wage rate in the competitive equilibrium.  MPL of labor in country 1 (country 2) is expressed by 
line NE (by line AT). 
 
Suppose that at the initial stage before migration the labor endowment in country 1 (home 
country) is O1H and that in country 2 (host country) is O2H, and therefore labor supply in the two 
countries as a whole is O1O2.  At this stage, the value of total production (i.e., national income) of the sending home country is the area of trapezoid NGHO1, and the value of the national 
income of the receiving host country is the area of trapezoid AFHO2.  In this pre-migration 
situation, the wage rate in the host country is BO2, which is higher than that in the home country 
(SO1).  Such wage gap between the two countries constitutes an incentive for the workers in 
country 1 to migrate to country 2.  
 
Now, suppose that some workers in country 1 (the number of workers expressed by HK) migrate 
to country 2 in order to seek higher wage there.  In this post-migration situation, the amount of 
labor that can be mobilized for the production in country 2 is increased to O2K, and that in 
country 1 is decreased to O1K, because the labor HK moves from country 1 to country 2.  Now, 
the value of goods produced in country 2 (Gross Domestic Product, GDP) increases to the area 
of trapezoid AIKO2.  But, the area of rectangular DIKH is paid as wage to the workers from 
country 1, and the net gain of income of host country’s citizen is equal to the area of triangle 
FDI.  While the GDP in country 1 is decreased to the area of trapezoid NJKO1, the national 
income of the citizen of country 1 (the Gross  National Product, GNP), which includes the 
income earned by the workers who are migrating to country 2, is increased to the area 
NJIDHO1.
4  So, the net gain to Country 1 is equal to the area of trapezoid DIJG.  Needless to 
say, the national incomes in both countries keep increasing until the number of workers 
expressed by HM migrate to country 2. 
 
Therefore, according to the traditional economic theory, international migration increases the 
national income (and economic welfare) of both sending and receiving countries. As shown in 
Figure 5, when HK of workers move from Country 1 to Country 2, the economic welfare of 
country 1 is increased by the area of triangle FDI and that of country 2 is increased by the area of 
trapezoid DIJG.
5  Based on such reasoning, traditional economists often argue that international 
migration gives economic gains to both countries, although both countries may incur some social 
costs as discussed in Section III below. 
                                                                 
4 Note the difference between the gross domestic product (GDP) and the gross national product (GNP).  GDP of 
Country 1 is defined as the total value of the product produced in Country 1, which does not include the value of the 
product produced by the migrant workers from Country 1 to Country 2 even if they are still the citizens of Country 
1.  On the other hand, GNP includes the income of these migrant workers as long as they remain the citizens of 
Country 1.                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
5 Note that this argument is based on the full-employment assumption.  If the emigrant workers were totally 
unemployed before migration, total income of these migrant workers is a net gain to Country 1. FIGURE 5 
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             CHEAPER FOREIGN LABOR EFFECT
  
 
Economic Effects under the New Framework 
 
However, if we incorporate other realities such as the existence of trade restrictions and non-
traded goods in the economy, the above simple argument collapses. The effect of immigration is 
not so simple as the above argument implies. Using a rigorous mathematical model, which 
incorporates additional realities, Goto (1998)
6 shows that the economic effect of immigration can 
be divided into a few sub-effects as follows: 
 
(Effect of Immigration)      =   (Cheaper Foreign Labor Effect) 
+  (Trade Barrier Effect) 
+  (Nontradable-Good Effect) 
 
Although the formal proof is a little complicated, underlying logic behind the above sub-effects is straightforward.
7 
 
Cheaper foreign labor effect  
It is often the case that the wage rate in the host country becomes lower as more and more foreign workers are 
admitted.  In other word, as the number of admitted migrant workers increases, the incremental cost of hiring them 
becomes cheaper and cheaper because the increase in the number of foreign workers tends to give a dampening 
effect on the level of prevailing wage in the host country.  So, the host country as a whole can be benefited from 
cheaper foreign labor.  Needless to say, there would be conflict of interests between employers and workers in the 
host country, because workers, including native workers, would incur loss from the decline in wage rate. 
                                                                 
6  See Appendix 1 for the specification of this model. 
7  For those who are interested in more rigorous argument and proofs, see Junichi Goto (1998), “The Impact of 
Migrant Workers on the Japanese Economy: Trickle vs. Flood,” Japan and the World Economy, vol. 10, pp. 63-83. Figure 6 demonstrates an intuitive reasoning for this effect. In the figure, ABEG shows the marginal value product of 
labor (MVPL) curve.  Since wage rate is equated with the MVPL in equilibrium, the equilibrium before the 
admission of foreign labor is B, where total domestic labor (OD) is employed with the wage rate of W
0.  In this case, 
total labor income is W
0ODB and total capital income is AW
0B.  If the foreign labor of DF is admitted to the country, 
the new equilibrium point moves to E, and the wage rate decreases to W
1. In this case, capital income increases to 
AW
1E, and total labor income accrued to the native workers and the income accrued to migrant workers become 
W
1ODC and CDFE, respectively. Thus, total income of domestic factors (capital and labor) is increased by the 
hatched area BCE.  Note that the magnitude of the (positive) cheaper foreign labor effect increases, ceteris paribus, 
as the scale of the admission of migrant workers becomes larger.  
 
Trade Barrier Effect 
 
This effect is pointed out by Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) in the context of international 
capital movement, but similar reasoning holds for international movement of labor.  Although 
the mechanism of this effect is a little complicated, intuitive discussion goes as follow.  Suppose 
that Country 2 is imposing tariffs on labor-intensive importable goods, such as textiles and 
clothing.  In this situation, the domestic price of the labor-intensive goods is higher than that of 
the goods in the international market due to the tariff, and therefore, the price of factor 
intensively used for the production of the labor-intensive goods (i.e., wage rate) is inflated and 
higher than that under the free trade.  When the admitted migrant workers are paid by this 
inflated wage rate, they are in some sense overpaid, and therefore the host country would incur 









                                                                 
8 Note that the argument here assumes that both native and migrant workers are paid according to their labor 
productivity, and therefore, there are no genuine wage discriminations. In reality, however, it is often reported that 
migrant workers are paid less than native workers. In the event that such wage discrimination exists, the magnitude 
of the negative trade barrier becomes smaller (If the wage discrimination is severe, the effect can be positive to the 
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In the real world, the share of nontraded goods such as construction and services in the total 
production is very high, although less attention has been paid to these goods by traditional 
economists.  For example, the share of non-traded goods in total consumption in Japan is about 54 percent.  When we take into the account the existence of nontraded goods sector, additional 
insights into economic effects of immigration can be obtained.  In fact, two-thirds of the 
unskilled immigrant are employed in the nontraded goods sector in Japan, and the number of 
immigrants working in such sector in the United States and Europe is also large.  Due to the 
employment of immigrants, the price of nontraded goods is generally lower than otherwise.  In 
other words, thanks to immigrant workers, native consumer can enjoy less expensive nontraded 
goods, e.g., cheaper maid service or street cleaning (positive consumption effect). On the other 
hand, the income of native workers in the nontradable goods sector would be lowered by hiring 
cheaper immigrants in that sector (negative income effect). 
 
Overall Economic Effect under the New Framework  
 
Since some sub-effects are positive and others are negative, the next important question is whether the net effect of 
the above sub-effects is positive or negative.  As shown in Goto (1998), the net economic effect of migration has 
systematic relationship to the level of admitted migrant workers (Lf) and the magnitude of trade barriers (t). After 
some tedious algebra, it can be shown that the following two propositions hold: 
 
•  The welfare declines by the initial inflow of migrant workers, but after a certain number of foreign workers are 
admitted the economic welfare turns to increase; 
 
•  The smaller the degree of trade barrier (t), the smaller the value of the threshold number Lf
1, at which the 
welfare level turns to be increased by the further admission of foreign workers.   In other words, the less severe 
the trade barriers are, the more likely it is that the admission of a certain number of migrant workers can be 
welfare-improving. 
 
Figure 8 summarizes the above two propositions. In the figure, the welfare level of host country (U) is plotted on the 
vertical axis, while the number of admitted foreign workers is plotted on the horizontal axis. Curve I plot the welfare 
level as a function of admitted migrant workers when the magnitude of trade barriers is t1 (higher t).  The admission 
of migrant workers decreases the welfare level of the host country first, but when the number of admitted foreign 
workers reaches Lf
1,I, the welfare level begins to increase, and exceeds the initial level when the number of admitted 
foreign workers exceeds Lf
2,I.  In other words, the admission of a small number (or trickle) of migrant workers 
produces a negative effect on the host country while a large number (or flood) produces a positive impact on the host 
country. This finding implies that when migrant workers are admitted, the admission quota should be large if it is to 
produce a positive welfare impact in the host country. Curve II plots the welfare level when the magnitude of trade 
barriers decreases to t2 due to, for example, a successful implementation of the Uruguay Round agreement. The curve shifts upward and leftward, and therefore the trough of the curve also shifts leftward and upward. In other 
words, a smaller number of migrant workers can be welfare-improving. 
 
Although proofs of the above propositions require a cumbersome manipulation of the equilibrium conditions of the 
model, a rough argument is that when the level of the admission of migrant workers are relatively small the negative 
“trade barrier effect” dominates, while the positive “cheaper foreign labor effect” becomes dominant as the number 
of migrant workers increases, and that the magnitude of the negative trade barrier effect is larger when trade barrier 
is stronger.
9 
The above analysis has the following policy implication for Japan: (1) while small scale 
admission of foreign workers has a negative economic impact on the Japanese economy, a large-
scale admission is beneficial; (2) the liberalization of trade barriers increases Japan's chance to 
benefit from the admission of foreign labor, and therefore the admission should be accompanied 
by trade liberalization. 
 
The Social Effect of Migration on the Host Country 
Diversification and Internationalization 
 
Since international migration involves the international movement of human beings as a whole, it brings about 
various social effects in addition to the economic effects discussed above.  For example, suppose that a Japanese 
university in Tokyo hires a Brazilian mathematical professor.  Although the job description of the Brazilian 
professor is probably to teach and make research into mathematics, his contribution to the university, and perhaps to 
the Japanese society, is much more than that.  His colleagues in the university in Japan can learn from him the 
economic and social situation in Latin America as well as mathematics, and listening to the Brazilian fellow 
professor will widen their perspective.  These interactions between Japanese and Brazilian would enhance mutual 
understanding between the two countries.  In economic jargon, such an effect is called (positive) externality. 
 
Possible Burden on the Fiscal Expenditure in the Host Country 
Since migrant workers pay taxes and receive various social services from the government of the host country, they 
give various effects on public finance in the host country. On the one hand, the existence of these migrant workers 
increases the revenue of the government, because they pay income taxes, consumption tax, and property taxes etc, 
and if they are enrolled in the social security system in the host country, they contribute to the social security 
system, too.   On the other hand, it increases the expenditure of the government, because they receive various social 
services from the government of the host country, e.g., education for their children, medical services, and pension if 
they are enrolled in.  
 
                                                                 
9  For more rigorous argument, see Goto (1998). Recently, the Japanese government published an estimate of fiscal cost and benefit to the host government (both 
central and local government) for three different stages of admission of migrant workers.  While the host 
government is benefited from migrant workers in Stage I (only single youth is admitted) because their tax payment 
exceeds social services they receive, in Stage II (with spouse) and  Stage III (with spouse and two children), the 
fiscal cost for the social expenditure far exceeds tax revenues.  When half a million migrant workers are admitted, 
the net cost to the government in Stage III exceeds one trillion yen (or about 8 billion dollars).  More detailed 
discussion of this estimate is provided in Section IV.   
 
Possible Increase in Crime 
 
It is sometimes argued that the admission of migrant workers may increase crimes in the host 
country.  Since Japan is a relatively homogeneous society and enjoys very low crime rate, some 
Japanese often argue that the migrant workers may bring about crimes into the safe country.  
Their logic behind such fear is very simplistic and goes something like the following: most large 
U.S. cities like Los Angels and New York are filled with migrant workers and crime situation 
there is extremely serious, and therefore, there must be some correlation (and causality) between 
migration and crime.  Therefore, the increase in migrant workers in Japan would make Japan 
more dangerous country. 
 
However, in my view, such claim is not substantiated at all.  There is no scientific evidence that 
connects high crime rate with migrant workers.  On the contrary, some studies suggest that, as 
far as the first generation is concerned, migrant workers commit fewer crimes than natives in the 
host country.  That is probably because newly migrated workers have higher motivation toward 
success in the new country, and because the effective penalty for committing a crime is far 
severer to migrant workers than to the native workers (i.e., only migrant workers face possible 
deportation from rich host country to poor home country!) 
 
 
Continuation of “3-D” jobs 
 
In many cases, migrant workers are employed in the job whose working conditions are less favorable than other 
jobs.  In Japan, such jobs are often referred to as “3-D job”, i.e., “dangerous”, “dirty”, and “demanding” jobs.  Since 
nobody prefers such 3-D jobs to other jobs, employers of 3-D jobs are often experiencing unfilled vacancies.  The 
existence of such unfilled vacancies would encourage employers to make working conditions there more favorable (e.g., better wage, safer workplace etc.)  However, if such 3-D vacancies are easily filled by migrant workers, the 
incentive for employers to achieve better working conditions would disappear.  In other words, due to the hiring of 
migrant workers, who are willing to take jobs under the 3-D working condition because even the 3-D jobs there are 
better than regular jobs in their home country, the 3-D jobs in the host country may persist even in the long run.  
Therefore, except for an unlikely arrangement between the receiving country and sending country that immigrant 
workers take unfavorable 3-D jobs forever, the continuation of the 3-D jobs may be counted as a negative impact on 
the receiving country. 
 
The Effect of Emigration on the Sending Country 
 
What is the impact of emigration on the sending country?  In what follows, the benefits and costs of emigration will 
be briefly discussed to supplement the above analysis.  I will concentrate on four effects of emigration: (a) 
remittance and income creation; (b) alleviation of domestic unemployment; (c) transfer of knowledge and skills; and 
(d) brain drain. 
 
Remittance and Income Creation 
 
Needless to say, most migrant workers emigrate in an attempt to make more money in foreign countries than they 
can make in their home countries.  It is often argued that such higher income benefits not only individual migrant 
workers but also their sending countries as a whole.  Since poor sending countries are often suffering from 
prolonged balance of payment problems, the remittance from emigrant workers is an important source of foreign 
exchange receipt to these countries.  In fact, the sizes of remittances for some of Asian developing countries are 
remarkable.  Table 6 shows the ratio of remittances to total exports in selected Asian sending countries in mid-
1980s, when many workers from these countries destined to the Middle East.  For example, in 1983, when the 
number of Asian emigrations to the Middle East was the highest, the ratio of remittances to total export earnings of 
Bangladesh and Pakistan were as high as 73 percent and 94 percent, respectively.  While the ratio has declined after 
that due to the return of emigrant workers from the Middle East, the remittance was still a very important source of 
foreign exchange earnings in these countries. But, as OECD (1987) pointed out, the flow of remittances is often 
unstable.  When the host country is in recession, migrant workers are often the first to be fired, and therefore, in 
recession years, when sending countries particularly need foreign exchange receipts, the remittances tend to 
decrease.  Further, it is often the case that, as more and more migrant workers decide to stay in the host country 
longer than initially expected and decide to invite families to join them, the remittances begin to decline. Moreover, 
the remittance may not necessarily help sending countries improve their balance of payment.  As Stahl (1982) 
reported, the marginal propensity to consumption (especially consumption of imported luxury goods) out of 
remittance income is very high. 
 
 





































Source: The World Bank and the United Nations Statistics. 
 
Alleviation of Domestic Unemployment  
 
Can emigration of labor alleviate serious unemployment problems in sending countries?  In many Asian sending 
countries, there exists enormous unemployment (and underemployment) problem in rural agricultural sector and 
urban informal sector.  Some argues that Japan should admit migrant workers from Asian LDCs in order to relieve 
unemployment problems in these countries. But, it seems rather questionable whether emigration to Japan relieves 
unemployment problems in Asian LDCs to a greater extent.  As Todaro (1986) rigorously showed using his three 
sector model, while labor emigration may contribute to the relief of overall domestic unemployment, this favorable 
effect may be offset by a costly rise in urban unemployment caused by increased rural-urban migration.  In other 
words, urban unemployment gets worse because more and more rural population move to an urban sector in the 
hope of further immigrating to Japan.  Furthermore, the number of unemployment in Asian sending countries is too 
large to be relieved by the emigration to Japan.  Probably, for a relief of unemployment, a creation of employment 
opportunities in these sending countries through foreign direct investment and/or increase of exports would be more 
important than emigration.
10 
                                                                 
10  This is especially pertinent for Japan where, unlike Australia, Canada, and the U.S., the geographical size of the 
country is small and the country is already over-populated. Transfer of Knowledge and Skills 
 
As well known, technology transfer has been one of the most important issues in economic development.  In similar 
vein, it is often argued that emigration contributes to economic development and modernization of sending LDCs 
through the introduction of new knowledge and skills brought back by returned migrant workers.  But, a survey by 
the Philippine Government (see Table 7) suggests that this alleged benefit is questionable.  According to the survey, 
two-thirds of the migrant workers, which include both skilled and unskilled, said that they acquired no skills.  Mere 
13.6 per cent of migrants said that they acquired skills through employment in the host country. In view of this, it 
seems unlikely that unskilled migrant workers in Japan acquire skills through their employment.  Provably, a formal 
training program would be much more useful than migration, in order to introduce new skills and knowledge to 




Economists have long pointed out that emigration causes "brain drain" from sending LDCs.  Since good skilled 
labor emigrates in the hope of receiving higher pay in the developed country, sending LDCs often suffer from the 
lack of essential professional workers, such as doctors and nurses.  It should be noted that even unskilled migrant 
workers in Japan often have very high level of education.  Since the wage rate for an unskilled worker like a 
construction worker in Japan is often much higher than the wage rate for a skilled worker like doctor or nurse in 
LDCs, people of higher education also come to Japan to take an unskilled job.  As shown in Table 5 above, more 
than 90 percent of these migrants workers have high school education (42 percent have college education), although 
almost all of them are taking unskilled jobs in Japan.  In other words, the persons who would work as an skilled 
workers like teachers and doctors in their home country come to work in Japan as unskilled workers, simply because 
the wage rate of unskilled workers in Japan is generally higher than that of skilled workers in their home country.  
Although it may economically benefit the migrant workers themselves, it is clearly a misallocation of labor, ant 
gives a substantial loss to the persons left behind in the sending country in Latin America. 
 
 
Table 7.  Acquisition of Skills by Emigrant Workers (%) 
 
Acquired through employment in the host country 
13.6 
 
Acquired through official training 
13.3 
 
No skill acquired 
67.8 
 







Source: The Government of the Philippines. 
 
 
IV.  Effect of Legalization of Unskilled Migrant Workers -- Some Estimates 
 
So far, I have presented a theoretical discussions of the impact of migrant workers in Japan after examining the 
salient features of the migrant workers in Japan and the possible reasons for the sharp increase after mid-1980s.  
Faced with the sharp increase of unskilled workers who were illegal in principle, there emerged heated debate in 
Japan whether Japan should amend the immigration law to legally accept unskilled workers.  At the end of the 




Using a rigorous mathematical model, which incorporate additional realities such as the existence of trade barriers 
and nontraded goods sector, Goto (1998) estimated the economic impact of legalization of unskilled migrant 
workers on Japan. 
 
Table 8 summarizes the result of the simulation for selected endogenous variables. The first column ("before") 
shows predicted values of selected endogenous variables in the base year (i.e., with no admitted unskilled foreign 
workers). The second column ("after") shows predicted values of the same endogenous variables under the 
hypothetical situation in which 650,000 (about one percent of the Japanese labor force) of foreign unskilled workers 
were legally admitted to the nontradable sector. 
 
While main interest here is an estimate for the effect of 650,000 foreign workers (about one percent of the Japanese 
labor force) because it is the number often used when the future policy toward migrant workers is discussed in 
Japan, I report two additional cases for the purpose of a sensitivity analysis of my simulation. The sensitivity 
analysis is reported in Table 9.  In addition to the case of 650,000 migrant workers, I did simulation for additional 
two cases: (i) the low case where the number of admitted migrants is 325,000 (or one-half of 650,000); and (ii) the 
high case where it is 1,300,000 (or double of 650,000).  As Table 9 shows, the essence of the following argument is 
quite insensitive to the number of admitted migrant workers within these ranges. In fact, in Table 9 the magnitude of 
the impact of the admission seems to be almost proportional to the number of admitted migrant workers. In what 
follows, I will discuss the case of 650,000 migrants (or one percent of the Japanese labor force), simply because 
"one percent of the labor force" is the number that is often proposed by proponents for the legalization of unskilled 
migrant workers in Japan. 
Table 8.  Economic Impact of Foreign Workers (650,000 Workers) 
  Before  After  Difference 
       Social utility
 1 
National income
2  (¥ bil.)
 
Capital income (¥ bil.)
 
Labor income
3  (¥ bil.)      
 
Labor income per capita (¥ thous.) 
Labor share




















1 ordinal utility. 
2 Tariff revenue is included. 
3 The income of foreign workers is excluded. 
4 = labor income / (capital income + labor income). 
Source: Goto (1998). 
 
Table 9.  Economic Impact of Foreign Workers (A Sensitivity Analysis) 
Number of Migrants Workers (Thousand) 
 









2 (¥ billion) 































 1 ordinal utility. 
2 Tariff revenue is included. 
3 The income of foreign workers is excluded. 
4 = labor income / (capital income + labor income). 
Source: Goto (1998). 
Adverse effect on workers due to the decline in wage rate 
 
The Japanese workers would be adversely affected by the admission of foreign unskilled workers. When the foreign 
workers are admitted, labor becomes more abundant relative to capital than before, and therefore, the wage rate is 
decreased. Since the number of the Japanese workers is assumed to be fixed in the model, the labor income of the 
Japanese workers is also reduced after the admission of foreign unskilled workers. 
 
According to our calibration, shown in Table 8, the annual income of each Japanese worker would be reduced by 
69,000 yen (about $575) to become 4,786,000 yen (about $39,880) if 650,000 foreign unskilled workers were 
legally admitted to Japan. The losses to the Japanese workers as a whole amount to 2.7 trillion yen (more than $23 
billion) every year. The amount of the loss is about 1.5 percent of the labor income. 
 
Note that, even when foreign workers were admitted to the nontradable sector alone, the Japanese workers in all 
sectors would incur a loss through the reduction of their own wages. Of course, in the very short run, workers in the 
nontradable sector alone would suffer. But, as time goes by, the impact would spread to the rest of the economy 
through the sectoral movement of labor. Hence, the Japanese workers in the traded goods sector, as well as the nontraded good sector may well be against the admission of foreign unskilled workers, because their income would 
decline after the admission. 
 
Favorable effect on capital holders (or employers) 
 
In contrast to the workers, the Japanese employers, who are considered to be representing the interest of capital 
holders, would gain because their income  increases after the admission of foreign workers. According to our 
estimate, the capital income would increase by 678 billion yen (or about $5.7 billion) when 650,000 foreign 
unskilled workers were legally admitted to Japan. 
 
Note that the above gain to the Japanese capital holder exists even if the migrant worker receives the wage 
equivalent to that of the Japanese worker. In reality, however, it is often reported that foreign workers receive 
substantially lower wage than the Japanese counterpart. If such wage discrimination were allowed, gains to the 
Japanese employers would be larger than the figure in Table 8.  
 
The employer in the Japanese industry is very eager to push the government to legalize foreign unskilled workers, 
because capital income would be increased by the admission. However, note that the magnitude of the gain to 
capital holders (678 billion yen) is much smaller than that of the loss to the workers (2.7 trillion yen). 
 
Adverse Effect on Consumers 
 
Contrary to the popular belief often held by the Japanese economist, our simulation suggests that 
the Japanese consumers would lose if foreign unskilled workers were legally admitted to Japan. 
As Table 8 shows, since the social utility declines after the admission of foreign unskilled 
workers, Japanese consumers are worse off. But, the magnitude of the loss cannot be intuitively 
understood by looking at the change in the value of the social utility in Table 8, because the 
utility is ordinal (rather than cardinal) number. In view of this, I will compare the values of 
national income, which constitutes the budget constraint to the utility maximization problem of 
consumers, in the two situations. 
 
According to our estimate, the Japanese national income (in 1986 prices) would be reduced by 2.2 trillion yen (or 
about 18 billion dollars) to become 273.0 trillion yen (or about 2.3 trillion dollars) if 650,000 foreign unskilled 
workers were legally admitted. The magnitude of the decline (2.2 trillion yen) is equivalent to 0.8 percent of the 
Japanese national income.  Of course, the decline in real GNP is smaller than 0.8 percent because the price of 
nontraded goods also declines after migrant workers are admitted. In other words, while the income of the Japanese 
consumer declines, he can purchase cheaper houses or services. But, it should be noted that the Japanese GNP declines even in real terms if migrant workers are admitted, as is indicated in Table 8 from the fact that utility is also 
declined. 
 
Incidentally, note that the decline in the national income (2.2 trillion yen) is larger than the decline in labor income 
less the increase in capital income (2.0 trillion yen), because the change in the national income includes the third 
factor (i.e., the change in the tariff revenue distributed to consumers in the lump sum fashion). 
 
Thus, contrary to the widely accepted verbal folklore that the admission of foreign workers would give a positive 
economic impact (although it may give negative social impact), our estimate suggests that Japan would suffer a 
substantial economic loss, if foreign unskilled workers were legally admitted, as long as the scale of admission is 
relatively small (e.g., around one percent of the Japanese labor force)
11. 
 
                                                                 
11 Note that here I estimate the impact of legal admission of foreign workers, where there are no wage discrimination against 
them.  If migrant workers are paid less than native workers, the economic loss to the receiving country can be smaller than the 
simulation result shows. Overall Welfare Effect -- Trickle vs. Flood 
 
However, the admission of guest workers can give a favorable economic impact on the host country, if the scale of 
admission is large.  In view of this, the next question to ask is how much foreign workers must be admitted if Japan 
is to derive a favorable economic impact from the admission of migrant workers. In order to answer the question, the 
simulation is repeated for different number of admitted foreign workers, using the model and parameter values 
discussed above.   Figure 8 is also the result of the numerous simulations. In the figure, the value of welfare (U) is 
plotted for various values of admitted migrant workers (Lf). According to the simulations, Japanese welfare 
continues to decline until Lf reaches 1.66 million (or about three percent of the Japanese labor force), and it is not 
until Lf reaches 3.43 million (or about five percent of the Japanese labor force) that the welfare recovers to the initial 
level without migrant workers (See Curve I in the figure). As discussed above, when the legalization of unskilled 
foreign labor is discussed in Japan, the proposed number is about one percent of the labor force (about 650,000).  
But, such a small scale admission is very likely to have a negative impact on the Japanese economy. 
 
Table 10 shows that, if Japan adopts more liberal trade policy, a small scale admission of foreign workers can be 
welfare-improving.  While the base calibration reported in Table 8 uses t=0.1329, the simulation is repeated for the 
reduced values of t in order to incorporate the impact of trade liberalization which would be brought about, for 
example, by a successful implementation of the Uruguay Round agreement. As Table 10 shows, if Japan succeeds in 
reducing trade barriers by half (i.e., t=0.066), Japanese welfare turns to increase when 0.79 million foreign workers, 
which is a little more than one percent of the Japanese labor force, are admitted. When 1.61 million foreign workers 
(about three percent of the Japanese labor force) are admitted, the Japanese welfare level is even higher than in the 
case of no admission of foreign workers.                                                  FIGURE 8
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 1 Base estimate. 
2 One-half of the base value. 
3 One-third of the base value. 





In addition to the economic effects discussed above, migrant workers give various social and fiscal effects, such as 
diversification and internationalization, possible increase in crime, continuation of unfavorable jobs, and burden on 
the fiscal expenditure
12.   
 
Recently, the Japanese government published an estimate of fiscal cost and benefit to the host government.  Since 
migrant workers pay taxes and receive various social services from the government of the host country, they give 
various effects on public finance in the host country. Needless to say, their work increases the revenue of the 
government, because they pay income taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes etc, and if they are enrolled in the social 
security system in the host country, they contribute to the social security system, too.   On the other hand, they 
receive various social services from the government of the host country, e.g., education of their children, medical 
services, and pension if they are enrolled in.  
                                                                 
12  For theoretical discussion of each social effect, see my Class Note 1 "The Impact of Migration -- A Theoretical 
Framework".  
Table 11 is the summary of the estimate by the Japanese government of fiscal cost and benefit to 
the host government (both central and local government) for three different stages of admission 
of migrant workers.  While the host government is benefited from migrant workers in Stage I 
(only single youth is admitted) because their tax payment exceeds social services they receive, in 
Stage II (with spouse) and Stage III (with spouse and two children), the fiscal cost for the social 
expenditure far exceeds tax revenues.  When half a million migrant workers are admitted, the net 
cost to the government in stage 3 exceeds one trillion yen (or about 8 billion dollars).   
 
Table 11.  Social Cost of Migrant Workers  (billion yen) 
  Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3 
Receipt 
Central government  
Local government  
























































    Stage 1 :  Single. 
    Stage 2 :  Married. 
    Stage 3 :  Married, two children. 
Source:  Japanese Ministry of Labor. 
 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, I discussed the impact, both economic and social, of migration on host country as well as sending 
home country.  At the end of the paper, let us summarize the main points discussed in the paper. 
 
As discussed using Figure 5, traditional economists are generally in favor of international 
migration because it involves the movement of labor from labor-abundant country to labor-
scarce country.  However, the new analysis incorporating various realities such as trade barriers and nontraded goods reveals that the international migration gives much more complex effects to 
the host country.  The complex effect can be divided into some sub-effect as follows: 
•  cheaper foreign labor effect (positive) 
•  trade barrier effect (negative) 
•  nontradable good effect (positive consumption effect and negative income effect). 
 
Moreover, we found that the overall effect has a systematic relationship with the scale of admissions and the 
magnitude of trade barriers. If the host country is to be benefited from the admission of foreign workers, the scale of 
admission should be large and, more importantly, the admission should be accompanied by the trade liberalization. 
 
In addition to the economic effect, the admission of migration workers gives various social effects as follows. 
•  diversification and internalization (positive) 
•  burden on the fiscal expenditure (negative) 
•  possible increase in crime (allegedly negative)  
•  continuation of unfavorable "3-D" jobs (negative)  
 
Obviously, international migration has impact on sending countries as well as host countries.  The following four 
effects of emigration on sending countries are often pointed out. 
 
•  income creation through remittance (positive, with reservation) 
•  relief to domestic unemployment (positive, with reservation) 
•  transfer of knowledge and skills (positive, with reservation) 
•  brain drain (negative) 
 
After presenting a theoretical framework for the analysis of the impact of migration, I presented summaries of 
empirical estimates of the magnitude of such impact, both economic and social, on Japan.    
 
In this paper, I presented a framework for the better understanding of the impact of international migration on 
sending counties as well as on host countries.  While I have discussed various effects of migration, I tried to avoid 
any judgement on whether migration is good or bad.  Neither I did say which of the above sub-effects are more 
important than others, because it differs from country to country.  More (empirical) studies are needed to make a 
value judgement of the impact of international migration on a particular country. References 
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SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
 
The theoretical analysis in Section III- (1) and Estimation in Section IV- (1) are based on the following 
model developed in Goto (1998) 




? ,   a + ß + ? = 1                     (1) 
where C1, C2, and C3 are the amount of consumption of exportables (good 1), importables (good 2), and non-tradable 
(good 3), respectively, and U is social utility. Consumers maximize the social utility function (1) subject to the 
budget constraint (2). 
P1 C1 + (1+t) C2 + P3 C3 = Y                       (2) 
where P1 and P3 are the prices of exportables and non-tradables, respectively, and Y is the national income. The 
world price of importables, which is considered to be the numeraire goods here, is set to unity. And t is the rate of 
domestic price markup of importables due to trade barriers. In order to avoid further complication, it is assumed that 
the world prices of tradables are given to the economy (i.e., the "small country" assumption). From the above utility 
maximization problem, the following three demand functions are obtained. 
C1 = a Y / P1                           (3) 
C2 = ß Y / (1+t)                         (4) 
C3 = ? Y / P3                           (5) 
The producers in the three sectors are characterized by the following Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Q1 = K1
a l1
1-a                           (6) 
Q2 = K2
b l2
1-b                           (7) 
Q3 = K3
c l3
1-c                           (8) 
where a > b > c 
Qi, li and Ki are, respectively, production, labor input and capital input in the production sector of the i-th good (i 
=1,2,3).
13  Note that capital is assumed to be fixed to each sector in the equilibrium after foreign workers are 
admitted, although it was mobile before the initial long run equilibrium was reached. 
Producers maximize the following profit function: 
pi = Pi Qi - (ri Ki + wli)                       (9) 
where pi and ri are, respectively, the profit and rental rate of the i-th production sector, and w is wage rate. Solving 
the profit maximization problem, the following equilibrium conditions are obtained. 
aK1
a-1 l1
1-a P1 = r1                      (10) 
(1-a)K1
a l1
-a P1 = w                        (11) 
bK2
b-1 l2
1-b(1+t) = r2                        (12) 
                                                                 
13  I am assuming here that labor is homogeneous in order to avoid too much complication of the model.   In the real 
world, many different kinds of workers, i.e., some are skilled and others are unskilled, etc.   (1-b)K2
b l2
-b(1+t) = w                        (13) 
cK3
c-1 l3
1-c P3 = r3                      (14) 
(1-c)K3
c l3
-c P3 = w                        (15) 
Note that equations (10) to (15) show that factor prices are equal to their marginal value product in equilibrium. 
Domestic labor supply is assumed to be given, i.e., there is no wage leisure trade-off. Therefore, the sum of 
labor input in the three sectors is equal to the sum of the domestic labor supply (L) plus the number of admitted 
foreign workers (Lf). 
l1 + l2 + l3 = L + Lf                        (16) 
The domestic supply of non-tradables must be equal to their domestic demand because, by definition, no 
international trade is allowed for them. Therefore, equation (17) holds in equilibrium. 
C3 = Q3                         (17) 
Since the tariff revenue accrued to the government is assumed to be distributed to domestic consumers in a 
lump-sum fashion, and since there is no profit in equilibrium, the national income (GNP rather than GDP), which 
does not include the income accrued to migrant workers, consists of factor payments and tariff revenue. 
r1K1 + r2K2 + r3K3 + wL + t(C2-Q2) = Y                  (18) 
By substitution, equation (18) can be expressed by (19). 
P1Q1 + (1+t)Q2 + P3Q3 - WLf + t(C2 - Q2) = Y                (19) 
The system of above sixteen independent equations ((1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), 
(16), (17), (19)) determines the equilibrium values of sixteen endogenous variables (C1,  C2,  C3,  Q1,  Q2,  Q3,  l1,  l2,  
l3,  r1,  r2,  r3,  w,  Y,  P3, U). In order to evaluate the impact of admitted foreign workers, the values of endogenous 
variables in two equilibria, i.e., an equilibrium when Lf is zero (before admission of foreign workers) and an 
equilibrium when Lf has some positive value (after admission), are compared. APPENDIX 2 
PARAMETER VALUES USED IN THE SIMULATION 
 
The impact of the legal admission of foreign unskilled workers on the Japanese economy is calibrated 
using the formal model developed above.  Parameter values (a, ß, ?, a, b, c, t, K1, K2, K3, L, P1) for the simulation 
are identified as follows: 
First, capital stock in the three industries (Ki) and  domestic labor supply (L) must be identified. 
Fortunately, the actual data exist for these parameters. Second, a, b, and c in the production function (6)-(8) must be 
determined. Since it is very difficult to directly estimate these values, an indirect method is taken. Namely, the 
actual situation in the base year (in 1986) is assumed to be in the long run equilibrium generated by the model, and 
the values of a, b, and c are calculated using actual (observed) values of endogenous variables (ri, w, and li). Further, 
note that, since production functions are of Cobb-Douglas functional form, a, b, and c turn out to be the same as the 
capital share in each sector. In order to determine the values of ri and w, the data in the National Product Account in 
1986 were used. Note that, as explained in the above, the economy in the base year is assumed to be in the long-run 
equilibrium, where capital, as well as labor, completed the necessary adjustment among the three sectors. In other 
words, the rental rates in the three sectors are equated with each other through sectoral movement of capital when 
the long-run equilibrium is achieved. Therefore, in order to simplify the notation, I denote here the rental rate in 
each sector in the base year as "r" without subscript i, and sum of the capital stock in the three sectors as "K.@ The 
income accrued to capital holders (rK) is the same as the national income (excluding tariff revenue) subtracted by 
the income accrued to workers (wL). The value of r was obtained by dividing capital income (rK) by the amount of 
capital stock (K), which had been already determined. Similarly, the value of w was obtained by dividing labor 
income (wL) by the amount of labor supply (L). From such calculations, r=0.1938 and w=4,690 were obtained. 
From the values of r, w, Ki, and li, I obtained a=0.4242, b=0.3785, and c=0.2234. Third, the values of P1 and t must 
be determined. By using equations (6) and observed values of Q1, K1 , l1 , r1 , and w, and noting that there is no 
profit in equilibrium, I obtained P1 = 2.40. In order to obtain the value of t, data on the average tariff rate and the 
tariff equivalency of the NTBs are needed. The tariff rate of 0.03595 is obtained by using the National Income 
Account published by the Japanese Government. For the tariff-equivalency of nontariff barriers in Japan (0.0936), 
an estimate by Laid and Yeates (1990) was used after adjusting for the Tokyo Round trade liberalization. From 
these, t=0.1329 was obtained. Forth, the values of a, ß, and ? in social utility function (1) must be identified. Since 
the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, a is equal to the expenditure share of exportables, and similar arguments can be 
made for ß and ?. From this relationship, a=0.2077, ß=0.2529, and ?=0.5394 were obtained. In other words, more 
than half of the income is spent on nontradables. In view of the large expenditure share of nontradables in total 
consumption, the inclusion of the third sector in the model seems to be all the more important. 
 
 
 
 
 